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Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic in Italy is the latest event following the 2010 European sovereign debt
crisis and the 2015 European migrant crisis to expose the limitations of the euro. While the worst
of the COVID-19 pandemic is over in Italy, the Italian economy faces a new dilemma. Italy finds
itself in a potential deadlock as other countries outside and inside the Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) are able to mitigate the impact of the pandemic through greater fiscal relief
measures. Therefore, the fate of Italy’s economic woes lies in the hands of the European Central
Bank (ECB) and the Economic Commission. The difficulty, however, is that the EMU and its
governing institutions not only are predicated on neoclassical economics that strips away vital
monetary and fiscal policy space for member states during a crisis but also lacks an autonomous
fiscal policy mechanism on the supranational level that can act decisively in a health crisis which
asymmetrically affects Eurozone countries. Provided an appropriate policy response from the
ECB and European Commission, everything would be alright in Italy, or as they say, “Andrà
tutto bene.”
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Section One
COVID-19 in Italy
Italy became the second deadliest epicenter of the global pandemic four months after Sars-Cov-2
was discovered in Wuhan, China.1 The first known case of COVID-19 in Italy was on 31 January
2020 after two Chinese tourists had arrived in Milan and traveled to Rome on a tourist bus. Even
though the Italian government immediately declared a state of emergency and suspended all
flights from China, it was not long until a cluster of cases was reported in Lombardy on 21
February including the first death reported the following day. By March, the virus had spread to
all regions in Italy. To stop the spread of the virus, Prime
Minister Giuseppe Conte expanded his initial lockdown
from red zone regions Lombardy, Piedmont,
Emilia-Romagna, Veneto, and Marche on 8 March 2020 to
the entirety of Italy the following day.2 In a nationally
televised address, he stated that any movement other than
for necessity, work, or health was restricted including large
events and public venues. The lockdown, however, proved
to be a little too late as Italy’s coronavirus death toll of
3,405 soon surpassed China’s 3,249 by 19 March despite the
fact that the latter had a population 20 times larger than the
former. (Kennedy 2020) While the province Bergamo
became the hub of the pandemic in Italy by 24 March (a
result of the super-spreader Champions League football
match dubbed “Game Zero” attended by 40,000 fans on 19
February3), other regions were making progress with testing.
For example, one week after the lockdowns, Veneto was able to test all residents and eliminate
the virus. Italy in total started to show signs of recovery three weeks after the lockdown. By 20
April 2020, the total active cases of COVID-19 had declined and Italy slowly reopened its
economy by 4 May. As of 9 June 2020, Italy had a total of 32,872 active cases, 235,561
confirmed, 34,043 deaths, and 163,646 recoveries. The figure to the left depicts the confirmed
cases of COVID-19 per 100,000 residents according to each province in Italy, highlighting the
concentration of cases per capita in Northern Italy.4

Impact of COVID-19 on Italy compared to Eurozone
The outbreak of the pandemic asymmetrically affected Italy earlier and harder than other
member states in the Eurozone. A crisis is asymmetric when the effect is disproportionate across
Eurozone member states, meaning greater in one country than another. This could either be
relative, in which the COVID-19 outbreak had a greater impact on Italy more than Germany, or
absolute, such as a forest fire that takes place in only one country but nowhere else in the
The earliest confirmed virus in China is traced back to November 2019. (South China Morning Post, March 2020)
The red zone region included major cities: Milan (Lombardy) and Venice (Veneto).
3
This football match between Bergamo club Atalanta and Spanish club Valencia was also responsible for the
subsequent outbreak in Valencia, Spain. The mayor of Bergamo later explained that the football match contributed
to “a strong escalation of contagion between people.”(Giuffrida, 24 March 2020)
4
Source: Wikimedia Commons, User Ythlev.
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Eurozone. This is evident in the graph below which documents the number of coronavirus cases
and deaths in Italy compared to Germany, Spain, France, and the Netherlands.
Graph 1 & 2: Coronavirus Cases and Deaths in Italy, Germany, Spain, France, and the
Netherlands5

Even though Spain eventually surpassed the number of coronavirus cases compared to Italy on
April 4, Italy’s number of coronavirus deaths had exceeded all countries in the EMU6. Northern
European countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, were able to flatten their rate of
deaths related to coronavirus early on in the crisis, despite the fact that Germany had an
extensive number of cases in the country.
There are several explanations for why the pandemic impacted Italy more so than other
countries. Sara Belligoni (2020) postulated five main reasons why Italy was a breeding ground
for COVID-19— Italy’s higher percentage of elderly people as the country with the sixth-highest
life expectancy in the world; Italy’s dense population with an average density of 533 people per
square mile compared to 235 in Germany; the close proximity of social interactions, such as
greetings with hugs and cheek kisses; the high infection rate without preemptive guidance for
emergency management; and the close ties between China and Northern Italy, the financial,
business, and fashion hub of Italy that disseminated the disease throughout the country.
Ognibene (2020) explains that the Italian government was in denial for too long, crediting the
early self-imposed quarantine of the largest ethnic Chinese community in Prato for bringing
down the infection rate in the town to half the nation’s average, many of whom had returned
5
6

Data provided by Trading Economics.
The United Kingdom is not in the EMU, therefore excluded from this analysis.
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home from China “afraid for ourselves, our families, and our friends.” Meanwhile, half of the
German population believed Italy’s poor governance was to blame. (Posner 2020) According to
Behnnhold, Germany’s success was attributed to earlier, widespread testing, tracking and
treatment backed by available technology and equipment prepared by hospitals and laboratories
prior to the lockdown despite the denial among politicians, and a populace that “widely
observed” social distancing guidelines imposed by the government. (Bennhold 2020) German
MP Eckhardt Rehbert in Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union even stated:
“[Italy] bears some responsibility for the situation it is in. Look at Italy’s health system. You
cannot blame all your difficulties on Europe and Germany. As a German politician, I find that
unfair,” against the backdrop of Italy mourning the loss of nearly 35,000 citizens! (Johnson,
Fleming, & Chazan 2020) Alessando Bramucci, Franz Prante, and Achim Tugger (2020) point to
the fact that Italy had been forced to cut back on healthcare spending as a percentage of GDP by
Germany as part of the austerity measures following the Euro sovereign debt crisis. Even though
the outbreak occurred in Northern Italy where the healthcare infrastructure was superior to other
parts of the country, the authors claim that “decades of tight fiscal policy [had] left the health
care system in Italy ill-prepared to fight the COVID-19 outbreak” while Germany had been
strengthening their healthcare system. Ultimately, Sciorilli and Karnitschnig explain: “Unlike the
European debt crisis—partly caused by the affected countries—southern European countries did
not cause the coronavirus pandemic, therefore eliminating the appeal to national responsibility.”
(Sciorilli & Karnitschnig 2020)

European Commission Delayed Response
Italy’s plea for help at the beginning of the crisis via the Eurozone’s Emergency Response
Coordination Center fell on deaf ears. It became clear that member states had abandoned Italy in
its hour of need once Germany, France, and the Czech Republic blocked exports on vital
emergency medical equipment. The European Commission neither stepped up to the plate as an
intermediary to support intergovernmental cooperation nor aid the severely overwhelmed Italian
health system that had run short of supplies. (Braw 2020; Henley 2020) Although China and
Russia stepped into the void and brought medical supplies, protective equipment, and antiviral
drugs to Italy, the lack of European solidarity during the coronavirus onslaught reminded Italians
of the European sovereign debt crisis and refugee crisis, adding fuel to an already strong current
of Euroscepticism in Italy. Italians felt like they had been treated as a “laboratory for corona” for
countries like Germany to just “watch them and try to learn from their experience.” (Johnson,
Fleming, & Chazan 2020) According to Italy’s permanent representative to the EU Maurizio
Massari, “Countries that are not immediately affected are mostly not willing to help. Different
countries obviously have different threat perceptions. We [Italy] feel that the coronavirus is a
global and European threat that needs a European response, but other countries don’t see it that
way.” (Braw 2020) According to a survey conducted in March, 88% of the Italian population felt
that the EU had left Italy on its own during the crisis. (Henly 2020)
Although the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen offered Italy a
“heartfelt apology” one month later on 16 April, positively received as “an important act of
truth” by Italy’s Foreign Minister Luigi di Maio, the response felt empty to many Italians
including Prime Minister Conte as EU ministers balked at Italy and eight other countries’ request
to issue “corona bonds.” (BBC 2020; Balmer 2020; Henley 2020) The “Eurobond,” or “corona
5

bond,” was the first European-wide recovery proposal that had been put forward by Italy,
Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain to the Council of
the EU as a new common debt instrument intended to share the cost of the crisis and fund efforts
to rebuild national economies against the stark economic outlook. Despite the widespread
support for Eurobonds across the Eurozone, the proposal for debt mutualization was met with
fierce resistance from the notoriously frugal northern countries, Germany, the Netherlands,
Austria, and Finland, and rejected the following day.7 Nevertheless, the fact of the matter was
that Italy was at an impasse with the Eurozone for three weeks — what Italy needed most was a
helping hand and medical support to assist in fighting the pandemic instead of tough love and
criticism. The delayed action, which proved disproportionately fatal for Italy, signaled the
urgency for the European Commission to establish an autonomous fiscal policy response on the
EU level rather than depend on the generosity of others in the instance of an asymmetric crisis.

European Commission Plan for COVID-19 Recovery
As of 27 May 2020, the European Commission has planned a €750bn stimulus package dubbed
“Next Generation EU” and a proposal to extend the EU budget to €1.1tn in order to overcome
the impact of COVID-19. The goal was to distribute the “Next Generation EU” program across
three pillars, the most prominent being the Recovery and Resilience Facility of €560bn equipped
with €310bn in grants and €310bn in loans.8 European Commission President von der Leyen
said: “These investments will not only preserve the outstanding achievements of the last 70 years
but will also ensure that our Union is climate neutral, digital, social and a strong global player.
This is Europe's moment.” The largest share of the proposal will be allocated to Italy with
€172.7bn followed by Spain with €140bn, despite the fact that both nations are recorded to have
the highest level of dissatisfaction with the EU’s coronavirus response. (Follis 2020) The
European Commission’s plan came one week after the announcement of the Franco-German
proposal for a €500bn recovery fund to be distributed in grants to the hard-hit parts of the EU,
albeit conditional on “a clear commitment of member states to follow sound economic policies
and an ambitious reform agenda.” (Fleming & Brunsden 2020)

ECB Plan for COVID-19 Recovery
The main recovery plan launched by the European Central Bank on 18 March 2020 was the
pandemic emergency purchase program (PEPP), a bond-buying program with a total envelope of
€1.35 trillion designed to counter the effect of COVID-19 until the end of June 2021.9 The PEPP
would support economic recovery in the Eurozone by “[bringing] us closer to the pre-COVID
7

After the proposal for corona bonds was rejected, the European Community met a second time on 9 April for a
common Eurozone measure against the pandemic and agreed upon €500 billion in aid and the possibility of the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The stimulus bill, however, was denounced by Italy’s Prime Minister Conte
“unless it [included] a way to share debt among members - something northern EU members like the Netherlands
and Germany staunchly oppose.” (BBC 2020)
8
The proposal came one week after the announcement of the joint German and French €500bn recovery fund to be
distributed in grants to the hard-hit parts of the EU. (Fleming & Brunsden 2020)
9
As of 4 June 2020, the ECB had increased the €750bn budget of PEPP by an additional €600bn and extended the
program from the end of 2020 to June 2021. This came after several economists and the Governor of the Banque de
France François Villeroy de Galhau warned that the “€750bn PEPP will not be enough.” Lagarde responded in favor
of the flexibility of the ECB and said: “we will not hesitate to adjust the size, duration, and composition of the PEPP
to the extent necessary.” (Arnold 2 June 2020)
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inflation path” and acting as a “backstop” to deal with “short-term market stress.” (Arnold, 4
June 2020) As shown on the graph to the left, the gap between
the Italian and German 10-year bond yields — a measure of
risk in eurozone bond markets — dropped when the ECB
announced the PEPP on 18 March and decided to expand an
additional €600 billion to the program on 4 June. The fall in
the Italy-Germany 10-year bond spread signaled confidence in
the market and lowered risk.10 Before the PEPP was
established, the ECB added an additional €120bn to the Asset
Purchase Program (APP) that purchased a total of €20bn each
month in government, regional, corporate, and covered bonds
as well as asset-backed securities due to the pandemic. The
APP also operated under the self-imposed rule that the
purchases of government bonds were proportional to the
capital key (the amount per capita each country’s national
central bank contributes to the ECB) and a purchase limit of
no more than one-third of each country’s debt. (Belz, Cheng,
Wessel, Gros & Capolongo, 2020) The PEPP differed from
the APP in that the assets bought by the ECB expanded to include national and regional
government bonds, Greek sovereign debt for the first time, supra-national debt, various types of
private-sector bonds, and commercial paper issued by non-financial corporations.

Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court Challenge
Although the program was intended to comply with the established rules of quantitative easing in
the Eurozone, the PEPP had proven more flexible after the ECB had controversially purchased
“€37.4bn of Italian government debt — €8.1bn more than its share of the eurozone economy
would suggest — and €23.6bn of French debt — undershooting its share by €11.7bn.” (Arnold 2
June 2020) In retaliation to the disproportional distribution of the ECB’s sovereign bond
purchases that favored hard-hit countries, as well as the purchases of Greek sovereign debt rated
below the legal investment grade for the ECB, the German Federal Constitutional Court
(BVerfG) ruled a ‘legal challenge’ to the central bank’s debt purchases, demanding the ECB
provide justification for its bond-buying program. (Arnold 2 June 2020; Arnold & Stubbington
2020) Furthermore, the German national court threatened to prevent the Deutsche Bundesbank
from participating in sovereign bond purchases unless the ECB returned to the strict one-third
rule of debt per nation.11 Since the German Federal Constitutional Court does not have
short-term authority over the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ), ECB President
Christine Lagarde assured Europeans that the BVerfG “will in no way compromise the
independence of the E.C.B” and its "flexibility across jurisdictions" in the pandemic emergency
program.12 (Ewing & Eddy 2020)
10

Source: Hirtenstein & Minczeski 2020.
The Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann also chimed in and warned that the ECB could risk being accused of
funding governments if the ECB continues to purchase an “illegal” amount of sovereign bonds greater than the
proportion of an economy’s size, such as Italy. (Arnold, 4 June 2020)
12
Even after Lagarde announced that the PEPP program would add 600 billion euro and extended time into the
following year, Bundesbank president Jens Weidmann had the audacity to warn the ECB that buying more sovereign
11
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Italy’s Domestic Response to COVID-19
Beyond the horrific death toll, the pandemic heightened the pressure on the already debt-strained
Italian economy. Before the crisis, Italy had the second-highest debt-to-GDP ratio at 134.8%
(well above the Maastricht limit of 60% debt-to-GDP for Eurozone member states) and
surpassed Greece in November 2019 as the riskiest borrower in the Eurozone. (Ghiglione,
Romei, & Hall 2020) This prompted the European Commission to warn Italy that its high debt
levels would prevent the country’s ability to access markets to finance deficits and “limit the
capacity to respond to economic shocks and market pressures.” (Khan & Dombey 2019;
Stubbington 7 November 2019) Since the COVID-19 outbreak had occurred earlier and harder in
Italy compared to other Eurozone countries, the European Union economics commissioner Paolo
Gentiloni expected “Italy’s recovery [is forecasted] to take longer.” (Guarascio 2020) This was
reflected in the bleak Italian economic outlook published by the European Commission. By the
end of 2020, Italy would see a contraction of -9.5% of the GDP, a drop in the government
deficit-to-GDP ratio from 1.9% in 2019 to 11.1% in 2020, and a spike in the public debt-to-GDP
ratio to 158.9%, the highest rate since World War II which the European Commission had
attributed to the “large fall in Italy’s gross domestic product.” (European Commission 2020, 95)
Furthermore, during the pandemic on 28 April 2020, the credit-rating agency Fitch downgraded
Italy to BBB-, one notch above junk status, while the rating agency S&P left Italy one notch
higher.
The issue is that if the public debt-to-GDP in Italy increases to the expected level of 158.9% by
the end of 2020, the Italian credit or default risk increases as it becomes harder for the
government to be able to service its debt. This compels credit rating agencies to review the
quality of Italian debt. If the risk is too high, the quality of Italy’s debt will be downgraded to a
lower level. In this case, the only lower level for Italy’s debt according to Fitch is junk status at
BB+. As a result, this leads to higher interest rates on new debt and higher borrowing costs for
Italy. Investors would sell the Italian bond which would trigger a decline in their price and a
higher yield, prompting a vicious cycle.
To cushion the economic effects of the pandemic, Italian Prime Minister Conte injected €25bn or
1.4% of GDP into the economy on 11 March, followed by a second government stimulus
package worth €55bn in early May that was “long overdue.” (The Economist, 2020; Johnson
2020) In the second package, the Italian government set aside €25.6bn for Italian workers, €15bn
for businesses, and €3.25bn for the Italian health system for the economy to ride out the
downturn. Conte also announced guarantees for bank loans and liquidity worth a total of €750bn
given to companies affected by the crisis, although reports noted hardly a fraction of the funds
have been distributed in the subsequent two months. Italy also has the option to tap aid worth as
much as 2% of its GDP from the rescue fund, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The
country, however, fears an all-too-familiar scenario whereby tough conditions attached would
“stigmatize the country [for] being punished for a disaster that was outside of its control.”
(Johnson, Fleming & Chazan 2020) Provided that the Italian government support is insufficient,
bonds than in proportion to an economy’s size, such as Italy’s, could risk being accused of illegally funding the
monetary financing of governments.
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Italy must rely on the stimulus packages from the EMU governing bodies to avoid the looming
debt crisis.

Evaluation of the European Commission and ECB Stimulus Packages
While other countries both outside and inside the EMU are able to mitigate the impact of the
pandemic through greater fiscal relief measures, Italy finds itself in a deadlock. The current
stimulus packages of €750 billion and €1.35 trillion announced by the European Commission
and the ECB respectively may seem generous in size, but in reality obfuscate the actual amount
of help provided to Eurozone member states. The Financial Times commentator Wolfgang
Münchau (31 May 2020) noted that the commission, as well as the ECB, create big headline
numbers to impress “the gullible” with the “statistical sleight of hand.” In reality, the loans are
“economically irrelevant since there is no shortage of low interest rate borrowing for the private
sector” while the grants are the real substance of the packages. Even then, all grants do not
constitute a fiscal transaction, as some are solely for the purpose of lending. For that reason,
Münchau notes that the European Commission’s stimulus is anything but Europe’s “Hamilton
moment” as Europe would only see an “annual fiscal boost of 0.6 per cent of the EU’s 2019
gross domestic product” over four years. Similarly, the ECB’s stimulus package provides
minimal real support. According to Chart 6 in the May 2020 Financial Stability Review
published by the ECB, the 4% total discretionary fiscal stimulus provided by the Euro area
governments as a percentage of GDP remains well below the United Kingdom (6.5%), the
United States (8%), and Japan (4.5%).

13

Italy is further constrained from expanding its fiscal stimulus in the EMU since “the associated
increase in public debt levels could [...] trigger a reassessment of sovereign risk by market
participants and reignite pressures on more vulnerable sovereigns,” highlighted by the forecasted
nearly 25% increase of Italy’s debt-to-GDP ratio by the end of 2020. Italy could also face a surge
in their borrowing costs if the ECB cannot absorb the expected extra debt issued by the Italian

13

Source: Chart 6 from the May 2020 Financial Stability Review, European Central Bank.
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government in the “pathetically small” pandemic emergency purchase program (PEPP) by the
end of the year. (McLaughlin 2020)
The external constraint imposed on the Italian fiscal stimulus is further apparent when
juxtaposed against the German fiscal stimulus package. On 3 June, Germany made headlines
when the government suspended their existing debt rules to pass a €130bn fiscal stimulus
package that included an emergency liquidity program for small businesses, value-added tax
(VAT) cuts reduced from 19% to 16%, and child care benefits to stimulate consumer demand. In
spite of the fact that the outbreak hit Italy much harder than Germany, the latter issued a total
fiscal relief the equivalent of 4% of expected 2020 GDP compared to Italy’s 3% of expected
2020 GDP. According to German Finance Minister Olaf Scholz, Germany was able to afford the
countercyclical fiscal stimulus package to bring the country out of the crisis “with a ka-boom”
since “we've been financially prudent in recent years and can draw on savings.” (Sandbu 2020)
Scholz’s belief sheds light on the underlying tension in the EMU embodied in the Dutch Finance
Minister Wopka Hoekstra’s suggestion to the European Commission to publish a report on why
some countries “lacked the fiscal space to weather the current crisis,” an explicit reference to the
frugality of the Northern European economies and the profligacy of the Southern European
economies. His proposition enraged Southern Europeans, reminded of the 2017 remark by the
then-Finance Minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem that the region could not “spend all the money on
drinks and women and then ask for help.” (Sciorilli Borelli & Karnitschnig 2020) What Hoekstra
and Scholz do not comprehend is that Italy would not have their hands tied if the institutional
structure of the Eurozone was not flawed or if Italy had its own sovereign currency, regardless of
their spending and debt-to-GDP ratio prior to the crisis.
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Section 2: The Limitations of the Euro
Institutional Flaw of the Eurozone
The chief architects of the Economic and Monetary Union hoped that the adoption of the euro
would promote economic growth, a higher standard of living, and European peace and
prosperity. Unfortunately, their experiment came at a grave cost. The institutional flaw of the
euro not only stripped away essential domestic policy space particularly in the wake of a crisis
but also pitted EMU member states against each other. Using a post-Keynesian economic lens,
this chapter exposes the flawed architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in
order to analyze its impact on Italy during the COVID-19 pandemic.14

Two Concepts of Money
The institutional flaw of the euro boils down to a misunderstanding of money. In “The Two
Concepts of Money: Implications for the Analysis of Optimal Currency Areas,” Charles A.E.
Goodhart (1998) creates a dialogue between two diametrically opposing historical accounts of
money, the Metallist and Mengerian “M-Theory” and the Cartalist “C-Theory,” that provide the
theoretical underpinnings of mainstream economics and heterodox economics, respectively.
On the one hand, the M-Theory posits that money is a medium-of-exchange that arose out of the
private sector to efficiently facilitate market exchanges by removing barter transaction costs.
(408) The M-Theory also states that money is determined by its intrinsic value, backed by a
precious metal such as gold, given the evolution of money from a precious metal to paper
“commodity” money (redeemed on demand for gold) to fiat money (without any backing).
Goodhart notes, however, that the M-Theory fails to find a plausible explanation for fiat money:
“Even if one should accept the M-Theory of the evolution of metallic coins as money, it is
problematic to use that same theory in its pure form to explain why agents should suddenly all be
willing to jump from using paper notes which were ultimately claims on precious metals to paper
notes which were backed by no specific assets.” The M-Theory’s “[abstraction] from historical
and institutional detail” therefore causes neoclassical economists to believe that a government
budget is constrained and dependent on taxes and private savings, so that printing too much
money will decrease the value of fiat money and cause inflation. (418)
On the other hand, the C-Theory is centered on the idea that the use of currency and the value of
money is determined by the power of an issuing fiscal authority. According to the C-Theory,
money comes into existence through taxes imposed by the state that require people to pay the
state’s currency. In other words, anyone can issue money but the power lies in getting it
accepted. Therefore, heterodox economists recognize money is a debt, endogenous, and creature
of the state because taxes drive money rather than fund government spending. This means that as
long as a sovereign independent power is in debt in its own currency, it cannot go bankrupt and
insolvent since the government can always issue more money. Divorcing a sovereign currency
from a fiscal authority, however, reduces the ability of the state to use fiscal policy to meet
societal and economic demands. (413)
14

The flawed institutional structure of the Eurozone is part of a broader discussion that post-Keynesian economists
have exposed since the start of the Eurozone. Please refer to Johnsson (2019) for more on this topic.
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Institutional Flaw of the Eurozone
The architects of the euro mistakenly constructed the single-currency union in the context of the
Optimal Currency Area paradigm, “a natural extension of the M team theory” that divorced
money from an issuing authority and de facto brought an end to “the sovereignty of its
component nations and their power to take independent action on major issues.” (Bell 2003, 165;
Godley 1992, 4; Goodhart 1998, 409) Member states were thus rendered “the status of a local
authority or colony” by giving up their sovereign currency to join a partially unified
single-currency union. (Godley 1992, 3; Bibow 2014, 5) This left the financial system of the euro
dysfunctional: there are no safe assets, debt is shifted onto weaker shoulders, and national banks
(like the Bank of Italy, La Banca d'Italia) are subject to default.
The fatal separation of fiscal policy from a sovereign currency can be understood through the
comparison of the Eurozone member states to individual states in the United States to the extent
that both “are users, rather than issuers, of a currency.” (Papadimitriou & Wray 2012) Unlike the
individual states in the U.S., the EMU member states are not guaranteed the benefit of an “Uncle
Sam.” While the U.S. government in the blink of an eye can invest in social programs, such as
healthcare and pension funds, or bail out the banking sector, such as in the 2008 financial crisis,
the euro member states remain solely responsible for funding national social programs and
handling problems with their banking system. As a sovereign currency nation, the U.S. is able to
run budget deficits “that accumulate high debt-to-GDP ratios with near-zero interest rates on
short-term government debt and nearly historic lows of long-term government bonds.”15
(Papadimitriou and Wray 2012, 3) During recessions, the U.S. government can enact
counter-cyclical fiscal policy and act as the lender of last resort. Unless the U.S. Congress
decides to impose a debt limit, the U.S. Treasury cannot involuntary default — a situation
foreign to EMU national central banks.

Policy Implications for the Eurozone
According to the economists Dimiri Papadimitriou and Randall Wray (2012), there are two
major implications of the incomplete Economic and Monetary Union. First, in the absence of a
federal fiscal authority and unlimited deposit insurance, individual Eurozone member states are
handicapped in a financial crisis. The authors explain that the financial liberalization,
deregulation, and supervision in the banking system permitted by the Basel Accords freed banks
to “run up massive debts that would ultimately need to be carried by governments that, because
they had abandoned currency sovereignty, were in no position to bear the burden.”
(Papadimitriou and Wray 2012, 2) For that reason, crisis-ridden countries in the euro area will
automatically encounter deep budget deficits that create a vicious cycle in which markets raise
the risk premium on their debt and prompt interest rates to explode. In the absence of an
open-ended wide-deposit insurance system backed by a currency-issuing fiscal authority, euro
governments are held hostage by the lending of their own private banking system and can only
“rely on the ECB to keep the interest rate down.” Second, the ratification of the “TARGET 2”
facility allowed depositors to move euro deposits to any euro member bank which ultimately
15

U.S. economic policy is determined by the ‘government’ — the Federal Reserve conducts monetary policy while
the U.S. Treasury facilitates the fiscal policy determined by Congress. Modern Monetary Theory posits government
“credits accounts (by simple keystrokes)” and taxes by debiting accounts. (Mitchell, Wray, & Watts 2019, 346)
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bred the conditions for instability in the Eurozone. Since countries moved their deposits to the
banks of the strongest economic country during a debt crisis, the Eurozone saw a flow of
deposits from the peripheral to the core member states. In other words, Germany, the strongest
country during the sovereign debt crisis with the safest available euro deposit, would not be
exempt from a crisis of its own if Greece, the weakest country at the time, had chosen to default
on its loans. The only solution to avoid “EMU bank runs and cascading solvency crises,”
according to Papadimitriou and Wray, is the establishment of “EMU-wide deposit insurance,
backed by the creation of a strong European federal treasury, [to] end the bank runs that are
afflicting the periphery.” At the time that Papadimitriou and Wray were writing, however, the
only existing fiscal mechanism in the EMU was the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)
and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a sum insufficient to directly bail out the banks in
the Eurozone. This changed when the then-ECB President Mario Draghi on 26 July 2012
decided to save the euro by introducing a new backstop.
After his infamous “whatever it takes” speech on 26 July 2012, Draghi launched the Outright
Monetary Transactions (OMT) program which allowed the ECB to purchase unlimited
shorter-term debt in the secondary sovereign bond markets for crisis-ridden countries. Similar to
the unlimited deposit insurance mechanism, the introduction of the OMT as an extension of
“whatever it takes” restored confidence in markets by ceasing the vicious spiral of sovereign
bond spreads that had affected lending rates and quickly stabilized the ECB without having to
buy a single bond. (Giavazzi, Portes, Weder di Mauro, & Wyplosz 2013) However, the OMT
forced countries to apply through the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) conditional on
humiliating austerity policies and structural reform, which the individual states in the United
States never had to endure. Furthermore, the OMT program was only a temporary tool and not an
automated mechanism. This meant that euro area member states could not rely on the ECB to
deploy this crisis-era bond-buying program if their economy went bankrupt and insolvent. Since
Eurozone national central banks cannot bail out their banking system or enact counter-cyclical
fiscal policy to alleviate the crisis in times of recession, countries burdened by a government and
current account deficit must enact fiscal austerity in the midst of a crisis to attract investors to
fund their expenditure and be lent credit to spend, albeit on undesirable terms. (Forstater 1999:
33; Bell 2002) Given that the ECB and IMF refused to lend to Greece unless its debt was
reduced by fiscal austerity and structural reforms, Eurozone countries are captured by their
private banking system unless the European governing bodies decide to get them out of a crisis
without their society taking the cut.

Italy in the Eurozone
Beyond the fact that the single-currency union strips away the domestic tool kit for countries in
times of crisis, the Eurozone has pitted countries against each other since its inception.

Zero-Sum Game
In a 1992 paper about the Maastricht Treaty, the economist Wynne Godley (1992) extends his
Sectoral Balances Approach to expose the foundational flaw of the Eurozone:
“if one region [in a country] suffers an unusual degree of structural decline, the fiscal
system automatically generates net transfers in favor of it. [...] What happens if a whole
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country – a potential ‘region’ in a fully integrated community – suffers a structural
setback? So long as it is a sovereign state, it can devalue its currency. It can then trade
successfully at full employment provided its people to accept the necessary cut in their
real incomes. With an economic and monetary union, this recourse is obviously barred,
and its prospect is grave indeed unless federal budgeting arrangements are made which
fulfill a redistributive role.” (Godley 1992: 192)
In other words, Godley argues that the structure of the Eurozone renders the single-currency
union a zero-sum game in which the public sector balance, private sector balance, and current
account sector balance must equal zero across member states. The ability for all countries in the
Eurozone to obtain a current account surplus is thus feasibly impossible without a federal fiscal
authority in a nominal floating exchange rate regime. Trade surplus countries during financial
crises will further benefit from the misfortunes of trade deficit countries since the decrease in the
value of the euro will further undervalue the net exporter’s real effective exchange rate and
create an even greater current account surplus. Since countries can no longer adjust their
exchange rate in times of crisis, the only way countries can acquire a current account surplus is if
they underbid their neighbor by enacting harsh austerity policies and structural reform to reduce
domestic demand for imports, a tactic known as “beggar-thy-neighbor.” The fundamental issue is
that if all countries choose to engage in such actions, the euro will board a deflationary train “to
poverty and starvation.” (192)
Although Italy reasoned that joining the EMU would strengthen the country’s weak reputation
for price stability to “convince financial markets that it would not use the printing press to inflate
away the value of its debt and hence benefit from lower risk premia,” the experience of Italy in
the Eurozone proves otherwise. (Gros 2014) Godley’s Sectoral Balances Approach highlights the
macroeconomic imbalances of Italy in the Eurozone prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, shown in
Figure 1 below.
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Figure 1: Sectoral Balances of Italy1617

Italy entered the Eurozone as a net exporter, a position that Italy had maintained since 1993.
Once the euro was circulated in Italy in 2002, the country’s current account balance quickly
reversed. Italy was the role model for the Eurozone — although Italy at times exceeded the
budget by at most 1%, Italy had complied with the Maastricht Treaty and balanced its budget
until 2008. During this time, Italy had to compensate for persistent current account deficits and
moderate private sector surpluses by holding public and private sector debt to finance their
economy. (Wray 2012) By the time the global financial crisis occurred in 2008-9, the Italian
government had to counteract the economic contraction by increasing its public debt as its
government budget deficit to GDP ratio had exceeded the -3% limit. Furthermore, Italy’s
minimal government budget in 2007-9 forced the private sector balance into a deficit the
following year. This meant that Italy saw its private sector debt-to-GDP increase when the
country was a net-importer, while the private debt-to-GDP decreased when the country was a
net-exporter from 2012 until 2018, highlighted by the graph below.
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Data from Trading Economics; Economic Commission.
The sectoral balances approach maps out the three-sector balances — government balance, private sector balance,
and foreign sector balance — for an individual country. On the sectoral balances graph, a government deficit
signifies that the government has spent more than it has received, therefore it must be plotted below the x-axis.
Government deficits are generally used to offset private sector spending, therefore the public debt tends to rise with
government deficits. The private balance is the difference between the private sector investment and household
savings, calculated by subtracting the foreign sector (current account) and the government sector (government
deficit). Private surpluses, for example, imply that the private sector has spent more than it has saved and therefore
should be plotted above the x-axis. The foreign sector balance lastly represents the inverse of the country’s current
account — the balance of trade (exports minus imports), net transfer payments, and net factor income (interest and
dividends). If a country runs a current account surplus, the country is exporting more goods than they are importing.
Hence, a current account surplus is translated into a negative foreign sector deficit and plotted below the x-axis.
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Figure 2: Italy’s GDP (USD Bn) and Public & Private Debt-to-GDP Ratios (%GDP)18

The graph also indicates that Italy prior to entering the Eurozone was able to maintain its high
debt-to-GDP ratio without a crisis. Given the fact that Italy had a near 120% debt-to-GDP ratio
in 1995, the post-Keynesian economist Stephanie Kelton noted Italy was able to avoid a crisis in
1995 as the Italian government could meet the obligation of its debt through issuing lira, a tool
that Italy could not use in the EMU. (Walsh 2018)
Referring back to the sectoral balances in Figure 1, Italy has achieved consistent current account
surpluses in the Eurozone since the sovereign debt crisis. This is not because Italy invested and
improved the technology and production of their exports, rather a direct result of harsh austerity
reforms imposed on the economy. Lastly, the European Commission’s forecast is shown for Italy
in the year 2020.

Policy Space in the Eurozone
Without the ability to adjust exchange rates in times of crisis, Eurozone member states are
heavily dependent on net exports to achieve economic growth. The economist Rob Parenteau
demonstrates this in his Parenteau Model, which depicts the available domestic policy space
given the fiscal objectives outlined in the Maastricht criteria.19 According to Parenteau, “the
domestic private sector and the government sector cannot both deleverage at the same time
18

Data provided by Trading Economics.
Euro member states must comply with the strict thresholds mandated by the Maastricht criteria — a maximum of
3% government deficit-to-GDP and 60% government debt-to-GDP — otherwise risk penalties imposed by the
Stability and Growth Pact.
19
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unless a trade surplus can be achieved and sustained.” (Mauldin 2011) Parenteau uses the
identity “current account balance - fiscal balance = domestic private sector balance,” which is
demonstrated in the Parenteau Model of Italy below. The grey triangle section highlights the
available policy space for Italy when the country has a current account deficit.
Figure 3: The Parenteau Model of Italy for Years 2008, 2009, and 201920

Italy only managed to reach the shade triangle 2 years out of 11 years as a net importer in 2002
and 2012. Otherwise, Italy found itself in a position similar to the year 2009 given government
deficits that exceeded the Maastricht limit. In those years, Italy did not have sufficient domestic
policy space, therefore the country relied on private and public debt to fuel the economy. Since
the sovereign debt crisis, Italy’s sectoral balances have been located in the fourth quadrant of the
Parenteau model with current account surpluses and government deficits.

20

Data provided by Trading Economics.
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Figure 4: Italy Government Spending to GDP (%)21

Lastly, we can see that the Italian government since the peak of the sovereign debt crisis has
been reducing i ts government spending as a percent of the gross domestic product since the
sovereign debt crisis. In January 2020, Italy recorded a total government expenditure of €79,038
billion, roughly €5.2 billion less than what it had in the same period in 2010 at the start of the
crisis right before the Italian government “delivered a harsh dose of austerity for Italy’s fragile
economy” the following year.22 (Mackenzie & Jones 2011) For that reason, the German and
Dutch Finance Ministers’ comments during the COVID-19 pandemic are highly misinformed
and attempt to blame the crisis on the Italian government.

21
22

Data provided by Trading Economics.
Data provided by Trading Economics.
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Section 3: Economic Policy Options for Italy
Introduction
The fate of Italy’s economic woes, unfortunately, lies in the hands of the EMU governing bodies.
In order to prevent Italy from insolvency, the ECB and European Commission should, at a
minimum, provide unlimited backing of Italian sovereign debt on the secondary market without
conditional fiscal austerity measures and, at a maximum, launch an autonomous fiscal policy
mechanism on the supranational level available for euro member states in times of crisis. If the
ECB and European Commission fail to provide the necessary assistance, the Italian Prime
Minister Giuseppe Conte warned the recourse of #Italeave: “What will we tell our citizens if
Europe does not prove capable of a united, strong and cohesive reaction in the face of a
symmetrical, unpredictable shock of this historical magnitude?” (Johnson, Fleming, & Chazam
2020)

Unlimited Potential of the ECB
The European Central Bank (ECB) has supported the survival of the Eurozone through funding
fiscal deficits and saving the Member States from insolvency. The fact that the ECB announced
the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program in 2012 confirmed that the ECB had
“unlimited euro capacity” to purchase as much public debt in the secondary markets as necessary
to save the euro. (Mitchell 2015, 98) Therefore, Italy can only go insolvent if the ECB refuses to
buy unlimited volumes of Italian sovereign debt in the secondary markets. By providing an
unlimited backstop, the ECB can set yields at any level it desires, including zero, and avoid
capital outflows from private bond investors in Italy by taking them out of the equation. Without
a program that pools the risk across all euro members, “investors will be forced to focus on the
financial risk each country is taking on to fight the pandemic.” (Stubbington 15 April 2020)

Alternative One: Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program
The first option for the ECB to assist Italian economic recovery is the continuation of the
pandemic emergency purchase program (PEPP). The expansion of the ECB would restore
confidence and demand for Italy’s long-term bonds to prevent insolvency. (Stafford 2020) Since
the head of the ECB Christine Lagarde is open to the possibility of expanding the aid of the
central bank, the PEPP should provide an unlimited backstop for purchasing sovereign debt on
the secondary market. While this is the best option for Italy, this will most likely reignite
tensions between the German Federal Constitutional Court, Bundesbank, and the ECB.

Alternative Two: Outright Monetary Transactions OMT
Should the pandemic emergency purchase program forbid the ECB from purchasing unlimited
Italian secondary market bonds, the ECB can resort to the Outright Monetary Transactions
(OMT) program put forward by former ECB President Mario Draghi — a program that
confirmed the ECB’s unlimited euro capacity to purchase as much public debt in the secondary
markets as necessary. Simply announcing the unlimited bond-buying program could restore
confidence and prevent insolvency in Italy, similar to the aftermath of the sovereign debt crisis.
While it is not clear whether the OMT would be an option that the ECB is willing to consider,
the ECB President Christine Lagarde signaled the central bank is willing to do whatever it takes
by stating that there was “no limit to our commitment to serving the euro area.” (Arnold 9 April
19

2020) The managing director of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) Klaus Regling also
stated that the OMT is not currently needed yet “things may change” given the volatility of the
markets. (Fleming & Johnsson 2020) If the ECB commits to the OMT program, the central bank
should omit the austerity conditionality inherent in the ESM application required for Eurozone
member states to access the OMT provisions. Since the COVID-19 pandemic was beyond Italy’s
control, there is no guarantee Italy would accept the OMT alternative with strings attached since
austerity is undesirable for the current Italian populist party.

Alternative Three: Autonomous Fiscal Policy Mechanism in the EMU
Ultimately, the looming threat to the Eurozone is no longer economic but political. The ECB has
proven that economic insolvency crises can be resolved by the unlimited potential of the central
bank. Now, the European Commission must establish a fiscal stabilizer on the supranational
level to intervene in a crisis and support aggregate demand when the domestic fiscal stabilizer of
a crisis-ridden country is insufficient. Dependence on the current bureaucratic process of the
commission or the coordination among Eurozone member states is ill-equipped for a crisis where
time lost corresponds to lives lost. Hence, an autonomous fiscal policy mechanism on the EU
level without strings attached serves to stabilize and revamp the economy to overcome the crisis
in the long run.

Implications for the EMU Member States
Member states in the Eurozone must also realize that they have a stake in the ECB’s decisions.
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been a record demand for 30-year German bonds
(Bunds) which signaled investors’ hunger for the current safest asset available in the Eurozone.
(Stafford 2020) German banks could see a “potentially catastrophic downside to their financial
sectors and their economies were Italy to default.” (Münchau 19 April 2020) Hence, northern
Eurozone member states should view the alternatives provided as more of risk insurance than a
handout. Furthermore, the autonomous fiscal policy mechanism provides immediate support for
all countries when faced with an asymmetric or disproportionate crisis, from a natural disaster
and economic crisis to a pandemic.

Democratic Responsibility
On a final note, the Italian government must understand that their democratic responsibility is
owed to their own people, not to Brussels. (Mitchell 2015) In recent years, Italians have grown
increasingly tired and fed up with the harsh conditions imposed by austerity and structural
reforms. Austerity does not sit well with the sitting Eurosceptic populist coalition in the Italian
government — enacting the humiliating policy on their own people is political suicide. For that
reason, the extent of anti-EU sentiment felt from the bottom to the top in Italy must be taken
seriously in the Eurozone. (Münchau 19 April 2020)
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Conclusion
If political tensions rule out the two alternatives presented in this paper, Italy will most likely be
faced with unpleasant options such as a sovereign debt default or a debt restructuring — both
could compel Italy to leave. Italians won’t easily forgive and forget the lack of European
solidarity in their time of need, either. Strengthening Italy’s commitment towards the EMU thus
requires the establishment of an automatic fiscal policy mechanism on the European
supranational level to prevent long delays in bureaucratic decision-making, act decisively in
times of crisis, and ultimately complete the project of the single-currency union.
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